Usage Control, Risk and Trust by Krautsevich, Leanid et al.
Usage Control, Risk and Trust
Leanid Krautsevich1,2, Aliaksandr Lazouski1,2, Fabio Martinelli2,
Paolo Mori2, and Artsiom Yautsiukhin2
1 Department of Computer Science
University of Pisa
2 Istituto di Informatica e Telematica
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche
Abstract. In this paper we describe our general framework for usage
control (UCON) enforcement on GRID systems. It allows both GRID ser-
vices level enforcement of UCON as well as fine-grained one at the level
of local GRID node resources. In addition, next to the classical checks for
usage control: checks of conditions, authorizations, and obligations, the
framework also includes trust and risk management functionalities. In-
deed, we show how trust and risk issues naturally arise when considering
usage control in GRID systems and services and how our architecture is
flexible enough to accommodate both notions in a pretty uniform way.
1 Introduction
Usage control (UCON) is a conceptual model, developed by Park and Sandhu
(e.g. see [25]), which is able to embody and encompass most of existing access
control models. The main features are attribute mutability that allows a flexi-
ble management of policies and continuity of the usage decision process, i.e. the
resource access has a duration and the specific authorization factors must contin-
uously hold. This enhanced flexibility w.r.t. the usual access control frameworks,
where, for instance, authorizations are checked once before the access, induces
several opportunities as well as new challenges.
Usage control seems a particularly suitable model for managing resources in
GRID systems. Those systems often consist of federations of resource providers
and users, with many long-lived executions and several conditions and factors
to be considered during the usage decision process. For instance, it is common
to have GRID computations lasting for hours/days. During the access it is pos-
sible that conditions that were satisfied when the access to the computational
resources was requested, change by demanding a revocation of access to the
resource itself.
GRID systems allow for remote execution of code, where the user that sub-
mitted the code is often a priori unknown. This feature demands for both coarse
grained usage control, managing the access to the GRID services (also taking
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into account the service workflow), and fine grained control on the interactions
of the code with the resources of the GRID node.
Managing resources offered by several providers to several users demands also
for mechanisms to represent trust relationships, and monitor their evolutions
during the system computations. Indeed, it is possible to apply stricter policies
depending on the trust level of certain users as well as to reduce the trust level
of users that do not respect security policies as initially declared.
Also risk naturally arises when dealing with access and usage control in GRID
services in several dimensions. For instance, a wrong access decision may have
a negative impact on the resources of GRID providers as well as a wrong access
revocation on GRID users. While the model defines a continuous monitoring of
decision factors (authorizations, conditions and obligations), in order to ensure
that these factors are satisfied even when the access is in progress, from a practi-
cal perspective this control often must be implemented by a sequence of discrete
events, by introducing the possibility that the decisions are not precise enough.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows a possible scenario where
the notions of usage control, trust and risk naturally arise in a GRID framework.
Section 3 illustrates the application of usage control to GRID systems. Section 4
shows how our architecture considers also trust management languages. Section
5 shows potential areas where risk plays a central role and how we embedded it
in our framework. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and recalls some related
work.
2 A Possible Scenario
Consider an Italian university (ItUni) which is involved in a huge GRID project.
There are several servers which apart of some internal jobs provide their com-
putational resources (i.e., CPU cycles, memory, disk space) for heavy computa-
tions of other Italian universities belonging to the same GRID. Sometimes other
research organisations, which are also the subjects of the Italian Ministry of
Education, ask for access to the resources. Thus, the first challenge for ItUni is
to map unknown subjects to the roles defined in its domain using trust chains
defining indirect relationships between those subjects and ItUni.
ItUni allows usage of its resources only to the users and computational jobs
which can be considered not very risky. This risk can be connected with a number
of possible threats, e.g., normal operation of the servers can be stopped; more
resources than asked can be consumed; important data stored or processed by
internal jobs can be stolen or destroyed, etc. On the other hand, ItUni is paid
for allowing other jobs to run on its servers. Moreover, in order to use the GRID
resources for its own purpose the organisation has to allow certain amount of
jobs to be processed by its servers (and get some amount of points).
There are two ways of checking the riskiness of granting access to a specific
subject: use trust/reputation and/or risk analysis. Trust and Reputation man-
agement helps ItUni to allow access only to the subjects which do not usually
abuse granted privileges according to the past experience of GRID nodes. Risk
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analysis, next to taking into account past behaviour of subjects, also considers
possible losses and benefits of every access. Since sometimes GRID jobs last for
several days it is not enough to check reputation or risk ones before granting the
access. This decision must be constantly re-evaluated during the whole session
and the access should be revoked if further operation becomes too risky.
3 Usage Control in GRID
GRID technology enables resources sharing within a heterogeneous, dynamic,
and distributed computational environment through Virtual Organization (VO)
[9,11]. The Open GRID Service Architecture (OGSA) [13], defined a standard for
sharing resources on the GRID that is based on the concept of GRID services.
GRID services are designed to broadcast, provide and compose the available
resources to the VO’s members. The Globus Toolkit 4 (GT4) [10] is the reference
implementation of GRID middleware according to the OGSA standard. The
GRID Security Infrastructure (GSI) [23] implemented in GT4 provides a set
of mechanisms and tools to manage accesses to GRID services. However, this
support is not adequate for the kind of resource sharing defined by the GRID.
For example, the default authorization in GT4 implies that an access decision
is evaluated only once before starting the service, and no further controls are
executed while the access is in progress. However, the usage of a services in GRID
could be long-lived, lasting hours or even days. Let us suppose that the access
to a service is granted if the requestor’s reputation is above a given threshold.
During the service execution, the reputation can be lowered as the result of other
activities of the requestor. Meanwhile, one-time authorization does not affect
granted rights and can not revoke the service execution because of the lowered
reputation of the requestor. Hence, the security framework should allow the
resource provider to specify that some factors should be reevaluated continuously
during the service execution.
In [21,20,4], we advocated the adoption of the UCON model for continuous
control of services usage in GRID. The Usage Control (UCON) model is a new
model that encompasses and extends the existing access control models [25,30].
Its main novelty is the continuous enforcement of the security policy during
the access time, because besides classical attributes, UCON also defines mutable
attributes, whose value is updated as a consequence of accesses performed by
subjects on objects. Moreover, besides the classical authorizations, UCON also
introduces two new decision factors that are evaluated in the decision process:
conditions and obligations. A more detailed description of usage control can be
found in [17].
In our framework [21,20,4], we applied the usage control model at two lev-
els: over GRID applications formed by a workflow of GRID services invocations,
and over computational GRID services. The usage control over GRID applica-
tions monitors the workflow of services invocations, i.e., the invocation to GRID
services performed by the GRID users, and the security policy defines the al-
lowed pattern of invocations along with conditions and obligation that should
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Fig. 1. Architecture of authorization framework
be satisfied before and/or during the service execution. The monitoring of GRID
computational service, instead, concerns the applications that are run by remote
GRID users on the local GRID node, and checks the usage of the underlying re-
sources allocated for the service instance by the resource provider. Hence, at first
the workflow level determines whether the GRID user has the right to access the
service and monitors that this right is still valid while the service is running. The
computational service, that in Globus is implemented by the GRAM service, is
protected by a further level of control, the fine-grained one, that checks that the
job submitted for execution satisfies the usage control policy while running.
The architecture we defined for the GRID service usage control is integrated
in the Globus one, as shown in Figure 1, and consists of two main components:
a Policy Decision Point (PDP), and a set of Policy Enforcement Point (PEP).
The PDP is the component that performs the decision process, by evaluating
the security policy for each access request coming from a PEP. The PDP loads
the security policy from a repository and every time an access decision is taken,
updates the current state of the policy. The PDP is invoked by PEPs through
the tryaccess(s, o, r) control action every time a subject s requests to perform
an operation r on an object o, and every time an access terminates, sending
the endaccess(s, o, r) control action. Moreover, the PDP continuously evaluates
ongoing authorizations, conditions, and obligations according to the security
policy. Indeed, the PDP invokes the proper PEP to terminate the service through
the revokeaccess(s, o, r) control action when an ongoing factor of the policy does
not hold any more,
To process an access request, the PDP needs to evaluate various factors,
and some of these factors are not directly managed by the PDP, but by some
other components of the architecture. Hence, the PDP can be viewed as an
orchestrator of various policy managers. Every time when a policy requires the
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evaluation of a factor that is not managed by the PDP, the PDP issues a request
to the proper manager. Moreover, the PDP could also send some feedbacks
to the managers, to affect their internal status. In the architecture shown in
Figure 1, the PDP interacts with the Condition Manager, the Attribute Manager,
and the Obligation Manager. However, other managers could be integrated in
the architecture. For instance, Section 4 describes the integration of the RTML
manager, that deals with user Trust and Reputation, and Section 5 presents the
integration of a Risk manager.
The Condition Manager is invoked by the PDP every time a security policy
requires the evaluation of environmental conditions. The Condition Manager
interacts with the underlying system to get environmental information. As an
example, the Condition Manager could retrieve the current time, workload, free
memory, and so on. The Attribute Manager is in charge of retrieving fresh values
of attributes. When PDP needs a value of subject’s or object’s attribute, it
invokes the Attribute Manager. The PDP also exploits the Attribute Manager
to update values of attributes. The Obligation Manager monitors the execution
of obligations. If an obligation is controllable, the Obligation Manager can ask the
subject to perform it. Instead, if an obligation is observable only, the Obligation
Manager simply checks it. The Obligation Manager returns true to the PDP if
the obligation is satisfied, or false otherwise.
The PEP components are integrated in the Globus architecture components to
intercept invocations of security-relevant operations, send the tryaccess(s, o, r)
control action to the PDP, and suspend the operation waiting for the decision
of the PDP. Each PEP enforces the decisions received by the PDP by execut-
ing or skipping the required security-relevant operation. Moreover, each PEP is
also able to detect when a security-relevant operation terminates, to issue the
endaccess(s, o, r) control action to the PDP, and to force the termination of the
operation while it is still in progress to enforce the revokeaccess(s, o, r) control
action. The PEPs designed to intercept service invocations are different from
the ones that controls applications executed by GRID computational services.
These PEPs manage distinct sets of actions on distinct objects, and they are
integrated in different components of the architecture. The PEP that intercepts
all requests for GRID services done by remote GRID users (C-PEP), consists
of two parts. The first part is embedded in the Globus container and enforces
PDP decisions done before starting the service. The second part is active during
the usage and is responsible for continuous policy enforcement, and revokes ac-
cess if usage conditions are not satisfied. In our architecture, a fine-grained PEP
(F-PEP) is designed to monitor the execution of Java computational jobs. The
F-PEP is integrated into Java Virtual Machine (JVM) that executes Java jobs
submitted by GRID users, and intercept the operations that applications try
to perform on the resources of the underlying machine. The interactions among
PEPs and PDP are executed according to a message exchange protocol, and
are implemented through two messages dispatchers, C-Message and F-Message
engine, for the two levels.
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4 Trust and Reputation Management with Usage Control
for GRID
Besides the need of monitoring the usage of the shared resources after the access
right has been granted to GRID users, security management in GRID envi-
ronment also requires to establish secure relationships between GRID resource
providers and users. As a matter of fact, direct trust relationships among GRID
users may not exist a priori, because during the VO formation phase, no trust
relationships are required to be in place among the parties that are joining the
organization. Hence, the security support should be able to evaluate whether
an unknown VO member that requires to access the local resources is reliable
enough to grant him the access. Moreover, the access should be granted even if
the user didn’t subscribe to the GRID node before. The standard authorization
system provided by the Globus Toolkit is static, because the identity of each au-
thorized user is statically mapped on a local account that is exploited to execute
remote jobs on behalf of the user. Hence, given a GRID resource R, only the
users that have been previously registered on R can access the services provided
by R. This feature is a limitation in an open and distributed environment such
as GRID.
In [6,5], we proposed to exploit Trust and Reputation management to enhance
the GRID security support. In particular, in [6] we proposed the integration of
an extended version of the RTML framework in the Globus authorization infras-
tructure to grant access rights taking into account the trust relationships that
each VO member collects as a consequence of his interactions with other GRID
resources. The Role-based Trust Management framework (RTML) [18], [27] com-
bines the strength of Trust-Management (TM) and Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC), providing policy language, semantics, deduction engine, and concrete
tools to manage access control and authorization in large-scale and decentralized
systems. The trust relationships are expressed in form of credentials, issued by
the GRID sites, that define the roles that a given user holds in those domains.
Each role is paired with a set of privileges on the resources of the domain, and it
is enforced by creating new local accounts with the corresponding set of rights.
The set of credentials is dynamic, because new credentials could be added by
other GRID sites and some of the existing ones could be expired. When an un-
known user asks to access the GRID services provided by a given domain, he
submits the credentials that grant him some roles in some (other) domains. The
RTML authorization system computes the roles that the user holds in the local
domain by combining the credential submitted by the user with the local access
rules, that represent the trust relationships that the local domain has with other
organizations. If at least one of the roles found by the RTML system grants the
right to access the requested service, than the access is allowed, otherwise is
denied.
Example 1. Figure 4 shows an example of RTML user’s credentials and provider’s
access rules. In this case, the user Alice has the role GRIDAdmin in the domain
CNR, and the role user in the domain ERCIM. Alice exploits these credentials
Usage Control, Risk and Trust 7
1. CNR.GRIDAdmin(mat=’12345’, firstname=’alice’, lastname=’rossi’) ← Alice
2. ERCIM.user(number=’IS137’, firstname=’alice’, lastname=’rossi’) ← Alice
User’s credentials
1. ItUni.GRIDGuest ← CNR.GRIDAdmin(mat=?,firstname=reffirst,lastname=
reflast) ∩ ERCIM.user(number=?, firstname=reffirst, lastname=reflast)
Provider’s access rules
Fig. 2. Example of user’s credentials and provider’s access rules in RTML
to access the services of domain ItUni, because the access rules of this domain
grants the role GRIDGuest to those users that have the roles GRIDAdmin in
CNR, and user in ERCIM.
In [5], we enhanced the previous approach by extending the RTML framework
to deal with a quantitative notion of reputation, and by integrating the resulting
framework within a preliminary prototype of fine-grained usage control system
for GRID. Hence, the resulting architecture has the capabilities of: i) allowing
the access to GRID computational resources to unknown users on the basis of
the reputation paired to them as a result of their previous interactions with other
(trusted) GRID nodes, ii) monitoring the operations executed by the user’s ap-
plications on the local resources once the access right has been granted according
to the Usage Control model and also exploiting Trust and Reputation as decision
factors collected by the PDP to perform the decision process, and iii) providing
feedbacks on the behaviour of the user that define the new reputation of the user
according to this GRID provider. These feedbacks (represented as credentials)
will be exploited by other GRID nodes to decide whether to grant or not some
access rights to the user in their domains.
From the architectural point of view, the extended version of the RTML
framework has been interfaced with the PDP like the managers of other de-
cision factors, and it is invoked by the PDP, when the security policy requires
the evaluation of the roles held by a specific user or of his Reputation. The
RTML framework exploits both the credentials submitted by the user and the
ones stored in the local repository of the GRID node to infer the roles held by
the GRID user and his Reputation. The result is returned to the PDP that com-
bines it with the other factors expressed in the policy to determine the required
access right.
5 Approach for Risk-Based Usage Control
Allowing access to a resource is always connected with a risk that the resource
will be abused. It is not always possible to allow only trusted subjects to access
a resource. This problem becomes even more important when we allow access
for unknown users (using Trust Management, see Section 4). Such assignment
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could be too coarse. Therefore, we would like to allow access only to the subjects
which, we believe, will not abuse its privileges. One way of doing this is to use
reputation of the subject, as shown in Section 4. A more explicit way of taking
this risk into account is to compute possible losses, using a well-known formula:
loss = probability × impact and compare these losses with potential benefits.
The behaviour of the system we consider is the following. A resource provider
and a resource consumer (subject) make an agreement about the usage of a
resource (object). The resource consumer pays the agreed amount in advance the
the resource provider shares the resources. In case the resource provider decides
that the access should be revoked it pays money back (full amount). Naturally,
the resource provider suffers from some losses if the resource consumer abuses
its privileges as well as when the access is revoked while the resource consumer
behaves well (loss of reputation). Revoking access of a resource consumer which
misbehaves does not result in any loss (though, some benefit can be assigned to
this case if needed).
Let CB be the benefit a resource provider gets if it allows access to its re-
sources; CL be the losses the resource provider suffers if the resource consumer
abuses its privileges in some way; C′L be the losses the resource provider suffers
if it revokes the access when the resource consumer behaved well; and p be the
probability that the privileges will be abused by the consumer. In order to make
a rational decision we should compare the resulting cost in case access is allowed
with the cost when the access is revoked. Algebraically, we can show this relation
for access decision making as follows:
CB − CL ∗ p ≶ −C′L(1− p) (1)
The decision to allow access should be made if the left part of the Equation 1
is greater than the right one. Such situation means that it is more profitable
to allow access rather than to deny access. Naturally, the access should be de-
nied/revoked if we have the reverse condition.
A subject can abuse its privileges in different ways (make a server unavailable,
install a back door, damage sensitive data, etc.) and every specific abuse cause
different amount of losses. Thus, we need to consider every loss separately (CiL).
In order to collect and process statistics required for determining the probabili-
ties of some violation (pi) we can use a limited set of such violations. Now, every
entity in the GRID can collect such statistics about violations done by its users
and share this statistics with other providers. E.g., in the simplest case we can
use three well-known aspects of security for identifying these types of violation:
i) loss of Confidentiality; ii) loss of Integrity iii) loss of Availability similar to [7].
For a more fine-grained analysis more elaborated list is required.
Equation 1 can be rewritten as follows:
CB −
∑
∀i
CiL ∗ pi ≶ −C′L
∏
∀i
(1− pi) (2)
Access control models empowered with risk analysis [28,7,22,2] use a similar
strategy to decide if access should be allowed or denied. Such model is based
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on the idea that the required values (benefits, probabilities, and costs) do not
change during the whole session. But GRID projects may last for hours and
days. Some parameters may change during a usage session and the validity of
access decision made long time ago must be reconsidered. Moreover, existing
access control models consider that access decision is based on attributes of the
resource requestor only. In fact, in some situations environment and attributes
of other resource requestors may affect the decision making process.
There are two parameters which can change during the access session: bene-
fit and amount of losses. These values often depend on the attributes of other
partners and environmental conditions. Naturally, probability of some misbe-
haviour for a concrete subject also may change, though this change happens not
so sharply.
Example 2. Benefit, which ItUni gains, can be increased if there is a need for
the ItUni to receive points to use the GRID for its purposes (points are given
for allowing other partners to use the resources and consumed when resources
of others are used). Benefits can be decreased if one of primary partners asks for
resources while a third party uses most of them. On the other hand, losses can
be increased when some sensitive data are processed by the servers.
In other words, losses and benefits are not constant during the access session, but
a result of some function which depends on some attributes. Both these function
require knowledge of the context and can be defined precisely only by experts.
Sometimes it is a manager which simply should change the values. Note, that
this change does not required rewriting of policies and evolvement of security
staff. The probabilities of violation are simply attributes of subjects.
Example 3. The computation of losses in ItUni can be a simple summing func-
tion, which sums up losses of all sensitive data processed in by the servers. The
need of points can be expressed as the losses caused by idle of the projects
ItUni wants to execute with GRID. This value is added to the overall payment
(benefit) for usage of the resources.
A risk manager can be easily added to our architecture shown in Figure 1. This
manager is just another manager block. In order to make a decision about the
access the risk manager needs to know: 1) what kind of threats must be taken into
account; 2) functions or values for losses and benefits and required attributes;
3) probabilities of violation, which are just attributes of the subject. Possible
threats and functions for benefits and losses are described in access policies.
Current values required for computation of risk are taken from the PDP which,
in its turn, gets attributes from the Attribute and Condition Managers. As a
result, the risk manager returns a boolean result to the PDP: allow or deny
access.
6 Conclusion and Related Work
In the paper we described our architecture for usage control on GRID. This
architecture allows to check conditions, authorisations, and obligations during
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various time of a session. Moreover, the architecture also supports the trust
management functionality. This functionality allows to grant access to unknown
subjects on the basis of the trust relationships that he collected with other
members of the VO. Reputation is added to the functionality of the architecture
in order to deny access for those subjects which are considered not trustworthy
enough. Finally, risk assessment helps to make a rational decision about access
based on the analysis of losses and benefits. The architecture also considers
that some parameters may change in time (e.g., reputation and risk) and, thus,
provides more flexibility in access management.
There is some related work on the topics of this paper. As a matter of fact,
some attempts have been done to enhance GRID security adopting standard
authorization engines, such as VOMS, CAS, PERMIS and Akenti [1,3,12,26],
but none of them provide continuous monitoring of service usage. Instead, in [29]
the inventors of UCON also propose the adoption of their model in collaborative
computing systems, such as the GRID. Their approach is based on a centralized
repository for attribute management, and the authors adopt the push mode for
immutable attributes, i.e. these attributes are submitted to GRID services by
the user itself, and the pull mode for mutable attributes, i.e. the values of these
attributes are collected when the policy evaluation is executed. Security policies
are expressed using XACML.
Although risk assessment has been applied to access control by several au-
thors, we are only aware of two papers on UCON and risk, namely [16,15]. In
these papers we considered different aspects of applying risk in the UCON model:
in [15] we assessed the risk caused by unfresh values of attributes, while in [16]
the problem was to select the less risky service provider and control usage of
client’s data after granting the access. On the other hand, the notion of risk
has been applied to several access control models. Indeed, risk for access control
can be used as a static parameter to help a policy designer to assign privileges
having possible losses in mind [19,14]. But a more promising scenario is when
risk is considered to be dynamic [28,7,22]. N. N. Diep et. al., [7] explicitly show
that risk should be competed and the decision is made comparing the risk value
with a threshold. On the contrary, L. Zhang et. al., [28] R. W. McGraw [22] do
not pay attention to how risk is computed, but state that the decision should be
made comparing possible losses and benefits. Q. Ni et. al., [24] considered most
of the parameters required for computation of risk as static, but used access
quota which reduces with increasing of the amount of performed actions (aggre-
gating risk of these actions). This change of quota can be seen as the change
of the benefit value in terms of our model. There are also several papers which
pay more attention to how to integrate risk in access control policies rather than
how to use risk for making an access decision [2,8].
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